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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
a propensity toward committing the alleged act.7 4 While the inter-
ests at stake in a civil action often are less momentous than the
possible loss of liberty facing a criminal defendant, it would seem
that the rights of a party in a civil suit also may be unfairly preju-
diced by the suggestion that he has a propensity toward certain
criminal activity. The facts of Guarisco are particularly illustrative
of such a possibility. After the introduction of Guarisco's 20-year-
old conviction, a jury might conclude that a propensity existed to-
ward criminal activity, particularly theft. From this conclusion it
might be inferred that defendant had probable cause to believe that
Guarisco was shoplifting, thereby undermining one of plaintiff's
causes of action.75 Such a result would appear harsh, especially in
view of the number of years which had passed since plaintiff's crimi-
nal conviction.
New York courts traditionally have adhered to the common law
doctrine allowing a trial judge broad discretion in establishing the
permissible scope of cross-examination. As recognized in
Sandoval, the exercise of such discretion can aid in preventing un-
fair prejudice to a party witness.7 The Guarisco holding appears to
be an abrupt departure from this wise policy, and as such, opens the
door to possible unfair prejudice in civil actions. It is hoped that
future decisions will reject the Guarisco rationale and read CPLR
4513 as permitting the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
CPLR 4519: Dead Man's Statute held not to bar testimony of
potential distributee concerning pedigree declarations made by
intestate.
Designed to protect decedents' estates from fabricated claims
and perjured testimony, CPLR 4519, New York's "Dead Man's
Statute," renders an interested witness" incompetent to testify in
11 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854; accord, People v. Schwartz-
man, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247, 247 N.E.2d 642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
846 (1969).
11 In order to establish a cause of action in malicious prosecution, plaintiff must demon-
strate that defendant acted without probable cause in initiating the prosecution. See W.
PROSSER, LAW OF To'rs § 119, at 841 (4th ed. 1971).
78 See Langley v. Wadsworth, 99 N.Y. 61, 1 N.E. 106 (1885); McQuage v. City of New
York, 285 App. Div. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1954).
34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
" CPLR 4519 provides in pertinent part:
Upon the trial of an action or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceed-
ing, a party or a person interested in the event . . . shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or interest . . . against the executor, administrator or
survivor of a deceased person . . .or a person deriving his title or interest from,
through or under a deceased person. . . by assignment or otherwise, concerning a
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his own behalf with respect to personal transactions or communica-
tions79 with a now deceased person. A seemingly unrelated eviden-
tiary principle, the pedigree exception to the hearsay rule, permits
pertintent hearsay to be admitted in certain instances"0 in order to
personal transaction or communication between the witness and the deceased per-
son ....
Competency to testify is dependent to a large extent upon whether a witness may be
characterized as an "interested" party within the meaning of the statute. In Hobart v.
Hobart, 62 N.Y. 80 (1875), the Court, in construing the predecessor to CPLR 4519, defined
an interested witness as an individual that " 'will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment, or, that the record will be legal evidence for or against
. . . in some other action.' " Id. at 83 (quoting 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 390 (2d ed. 1844)).
See, e.g., Herrmann v. Jorgenson, 263 N.Y. 348, 189 N.E. 449 (1934); In re Will of Eno, 196
App. Div. 131, 187 N.Y.S. 756 (1st Dep't 1921); People v. Tuthill, 176 App. Div. 631, 163
N.Y.S. 843 (1st Dep't 1917). See generally 5 WK&M I 4519.01-.23; W. RICHARDSON,
EvIDENCE §§ 395-405 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON].
11 The courts construe the words "transactions or communications" broadly to embrace
"every variety of affairs . . . . If the deceased could contradict, explain or qualify the...
[evidence], if living, it comes within the rule." Van Vechten v. Van Vechten, 65 Hun. 215,
223, 20 N.Y.S. 140, 142 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1892). In Kennedy v. Mulligan, 173 App.
Div. 859, 160 N.Y.S. 105 (1st Dep't 1916), the court observed that this liberal interpretation
is consistent with the purpose of the statute which is "'to retain the equality between the
parties which otherwise . . . would have been destroyed by the death of the deceased.'" Id.
at 860, 160 N.Y.S. at 106 (quoting Griswold v. Hart, 205 N.Y. 384, 395, 98 N.E. 918, 922
(1912)). See Abbott v. Doughan, 204 N.Y. 222, 226, 97 N.E. 599, 600 (1912).
It should be noted that CPLR 4519 itself provides for several exceptions to the Dead
Man's rule. Thus, the statute does not bar an interested person from testifying when "the
executor, administrator, [or] survivor . . . [of the decedent] is examined in his own behalf,
or the testimony of the . . . deceased person is given in evidence, concerning the same
transaction or communication." CPLR 4519. In Ward v. Kovacs, 55 App. Div. 2d 391, 390
N.Y.S.2d 931 (2d Dep't 1977), the Appellate Division, Second Department, construed the
latter portion of this language so as to permit an interested party to render himself competent
by submitting the decedent's former testimony into evidence. Also exempt from the operation
of the statute are stockholders or officers of any bank corporation which is a party to the
action. CPLR 4519. Further, the statute permits an otherwise incompetent witness to testify
as to the facts of a vehicular accident but not specific conversations with the decedent. See,
e.g., Rost v. Kessler, 267 App. Div. 686, 49 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dep't 1944). A further limited
exception, which is applicable only in Surrogate's Court proceedings, is contained in EPTL
§ 5-1.1(b)(3) and permits a surviving spouse to prove his contribution to bank accounts held
jointly, or property held as tenants by the entirety with the deceased spouse. Finally, in Nay
v. Curley, 113 N.Y. 575, 21 N.E. 698 (1889), the Court recognized that the statute does not
abrogate the common law rule allowing a witness to testify as to the entire transaction after
an adverse party has examined him with respect to a portion of the transaction. Thus, if the
decedent's representative examines an incompetent witness concerning a transaction or com-
munication with the deceased, "the witness is entitled to state the whole transaction or
conversation. ... Id. at 579, 21 N.E. at 699.
In Aalholm v. People, 211 N.Y. 406, 105 N.E. 647 (1914), the Court articulated the
three requirements that must be satisfied to bring evidence within the pedigree exception:
first, the declarant must be deceased; second, the declarant must have been related by blood
or affinity to the family about whom he speaks; and, third, the statement must predate the
controversy. Id. at 412-13, 105 N.E. at 649. See RICHARDSON, supra note 78, § 321. Although
the Aalholm Court indicated that the declarant's death is an absolute prerequisite to the
admission of pedigree, in the earlier case of Young v. Shulenberg, 165 N.Y. 385, 59 N.E. 135
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prove "family lineage, descent and succession. "18 Relying upon the
somewhat ambiguous statement of one commentator, 82 some au-
thorities have begun to recognize an interrelationship between these
two rules of law. 3 Recently, in In re Estate of Berlin,8 4 the Surro-
gate's Court, Bronx County, held that the Dead Man's Statute does
not bar a potential distributee from giving testimony concerning
pedigree declarations made directly by the intestate.85
Alleging that she was the sole distributee of Freida Berlin and
that as such, she was entitled to receive Berlin's entire estate, Gol-
die Berkowitz objected to the settlement of the public administra-
tor's account for that estate.8 6 In attempting to establish her rela-
tionship with the deceased, the objectant offered documentary and
other evidence, 8 as well as her own hearsay testimony, as to her
(1901), the Court had adopted a more liberal approach, stating: "Before the declarations can
be received . . it must appear that the person making them was a member of the family
and that he is dead, incompetent, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court. " Id. at 388, 59 N.E.
at 136 (emphasis added). The Young Court found the declarant's absence from the jurisdic-
tion sufficient to satisfy this test, but went on to note that since the declarant was born well
over 100 years before the trial, her death would be presumed. Id. at 389-90, 59 N.E. at 137.
11 E. FISCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 973 (2d ed. 1977). The pedigree exception may be
invoked only when pedigree is directly in issue. For instance, if a claimant must establish
that he is the heir-at-law of a decedent, pedigree evidence is admissible. See Eisenlord v.
Clum, 126 N.Y. 552, 27 N.E. 1024 (1891). Where pedigree merely is a tangential issue,
however, pedigree evidence will not be admitted at trial. See People v. Lammes, 208 App.
Div. 533, 534-35, 203 N.Y.S. 736, 738 (4th Dep't 1924) (pedigree not admissible to establish
age in rape case). See generally E. FisCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE §§ 973-82 (2d ed. 1977); Ladd,
The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271 (1952).
92 5 WK&M 4519.22, wherein it is stated that: "[oither forms of hearsay should also
be permitted if they meet a hearsay exception." See note 97 infra. There is no hearsay
exception which in itself removes the testimonial prohibition of the Dead Man's Statute. See
id. CPLR 4517, however, permits a party's former testimony to be admitted into evidence
even if that person is incompetent by virtue of the evidence Dead Man's Statute:
In a civil action, if a witness' testimony is not available because of. . .death...
or because he is incompetent to testify by virtue of section 4519, his testimony,
taken or introduced in evidence at a former trial. . .may be introduced in evidence
by any party upon any trial of the same subject-matter in the same or another
action between the same parties or their representatives, subject to any objection
to admissibility other than hearsay.
CPLR 4517. See Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1964), in which the Court set out the basic rules governing the admissibility of former testi-
mony. Not only must the subject matter at the subsequent trial be substantially the same as
that at the first trial, but the party against whom the hearsay is being admitted must have
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the former trial. Id. at 339, 200 N.E.2d
at 553, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
See Phyllis D. v. Salvatore D., 79 Misc. 2d 6, 7, 358 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (Family Ct.
Kings County 1974); note 97 infra.
' 91 Misc. 2d 666, 398 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1977).
Id. at 668, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
Id. at 666, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 3, 1977, at 32, col. 1, reprinted, as abridged, in 91 Misc. 2d 666, 398
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conversations with the decedent, raising the question of the admissi-
bility of such testimony in view of the provisions of CPLR 4519.88
Surrogate Gelfand ruled that, notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 4519, objectant Berkowitz was competent to testify concern-
ing the pedigree declarations of the deceased. 89 Finding that
"[tiestimony as to a conversation between decedent and objectant
is no more subject to being perjurious than would be conversations
objectant testified to with other deceased . . . persons," the court
concluded that application of the Dead Man's Statute in this in-
stance would impose an unreasonable limitation upon the pedigree
exception.9" Brushing aside fears that this holding would open the
floodgates to falsified claims, Surrogate Gelfand went on to hold
that the objectant's testimony must be corroborated by other inde-
pendent pedigree evidence.'
It is suggested that the Berlin court improperly failed to distin-
guish between two separate principles of law and thereby reached
an erroneous conclusion as to objectant Berkowitz' competency to
testify. At common law, all persons having a pecuniary interest in
a particular cause were incompetent to give evidence as witnesses
at the trial of that cause.9" When this harsh common law doctrine
was abolished by statute,93 the legislature deemed the enactment of
a Dead Man's Statute necessary "to prevent the living from perjur-
ing themselves to the disadvantage of the dead. . ... ,9' In light of
N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County). The decedent's attorney was called to testify as to
declarations decedent had made concerning the composition of her family. The attorney's
testimony led to the conclusion that the objectant was the only remaining distributee. Al-
though an objection to the attorney's testimony had been interposed on the ground that it
constituted hearsay, the testimony was admitted under the pedigree exception. Id.
" 91 Misc. 2d at 668, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
" Id.
Id.
, Id. at 668-69, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 336. Interestingly, independent evidence of pedigree
normally is required only when the declarant is not the person with whom a family relation-
ship is sought to be established. See Young v. Shulenberg, 165 N.Y. 385, 59 N.E. 135 (1901).
92 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 575-76 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
Professor Wigmore articulated the rationale underlying the common law rule in the following
syllogism:
Total exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against false decision, when-
ever the persons offered are of a class specially likely to speak falsely; Persons
having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are specially likely to speak
falsely; Therefore such persons should be totally excluded.
Id. § 576, at 686.
,3 Ch. 379, 99 351-352, [1848] N.Y. Laws.
" SEcoND REP. 268. See WIGMORE, supra note 92, § 578 (citing Owens v. Owens, 14 W.
Va. 88 (1878)). The Owens court explained that abolition of the Dead Man's Statute "would
place in great peril the estates of the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for
[Vol. 52:137
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this historical evolution, it is clear that the Dead Man's Statute
deals with the competency of a witness to testify and not the admis-
sibility of any particular evidence. 5 In contrast, the pedigree excep-
tion to the hearsay rule is concerned solely with the admissibility
of evidence.96 Thus, while the pedigree doctrine may lead to a find-
ing that certain testimony is admissible into evidence, the rule is not
relevant to a determination whether a particular person may pro-
perly give the evidence. Unfortunately, the Berlin court apparently
did not perceive this distinction, and instead commingled the ques-
tion of admissibility with the issue of competency. 7 Had the surro-
the dishonest and unscrupulous." Id. at 95. Despite the potential for injustice created by the
Dead Man's Statute's exclusion of possibly probative evidence, many positive and just results
may be produced by the operation of the statute. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sheehan, 51 App.
Div. 2d 645, 378 N.Y.S.2d 141 (4th Dep't 1976) (mem.) (legatee who forced decedent to sign
codicil was not permitted to testify as proponent of codicil).
" See 5 WK&M 4519.04; RICHARDSON, supra note 78, § 395.
" See RICHARDSON, supra note 78, §§ 319-20. Lord Chancellor Erskine in Vowles v.
Young, 33 Eng. Rep. 247 (1806) explained the rationale behind admitting pedigree evidence:
Courts of Law are obliged in cases of this kind to depart from the ordinary rules of
evidence; as it would be impossible to establish descents according to the strict
rules, by which contracts are established, and subjects of property regulated; re-
quiring the facts from the mouth of the witness, who has the knowledge of them.
In cases of pedigree therefore recourse is had to a secondary sort of evidence: the
best the nature of the subject will admit; establishing the descent from the only
sources that can be had.
Id. at 249, quoted in In re Estate of Berlin, 398 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County
1977). See, e.g., In re Estate of Glaser, 151 Misc. 778, 273 N.Y.S. 860 (Sur. Ct. Richmond
County (1934). It should be noted that pedigree evidence is also admissible to prove a negative
proposition, such as the fact that a particular individual had no children. See Washington v.
Bank for Sav., 171 N.Y. 166, 63 N.E. 831 (1902).
17 See 91 Misc. 2d at 668-69, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36. The exact question presented in
Berlin never has been addressed by the Court of Appeals. In two early lower court cases,
however, it was held that an alleged distributee may not by her testimony seek to establish a
common law marriage with an intestate. See In re Brush, 25 App. Div. 610, 49 N.Y.S. 803
(1st Dep't. 1898); In re Estate of Cooke, 195 Misc. 468, 85 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sur. Ct. Queens
County 1949).
More recently, the Family Court, Kings County, by way of dictum in Phyllis D. v.
Salvatore D., 79 Misc. 2d 6, 358 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Family Ct. Kings County 1974), stated that
"hearsay which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule should be allowed as a
substitute for testimony otherwise barred by the dead-man's statute." Id. at 7, 358 N.Y.S.2d
at 922-23 (citing 5 WK&M 4519.22). Weinstein, Korn, and Miller indicate that "[o]ther
forms of hearsay should also be permitted [as a substitute for barred testimony] if they meet
a hearsay exception." In support of this proposition, the authors point to a case admitting
the former testimony of a plaintiff at a second trial held after the defendant had died. See
Dean v. Halliburton, 241 N.Y. 354, 150 N.E. 141 (1925). Former testimony differs, however,
for Dead Man's Statute purposes from other forms of hearsay in two respects. First, CPLR
4517 expressly recognizes that a witness may be rendered unavailable as a result of the
operation of the Dead Man's Statute, and thus seems to sanction introduction of the former
testimony of a now incompetent witness. See CPLR 4517. Second, by definition, the former
testimony of the witness had to be given at a time when the Dead Man's Statute did not
19771
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gate analyzed separately the two issues, it is submitted, he would
have been led to the conclusion that the testimony offered was ad-
missible in the abstract, but that CPLR 4519 rendered the objec-
tant, Goldie Berkowitz, incompetent to testify with respect to such
evidence.
Surrogate Gelfand offered a dual justification for his decision;
he reasoned that application of 4519 would limit unreasonably the
scope of the pedigree exception,9" and that the testimony of the
interested witness as to the intestate's declarations was no more
likely to be perjurious than testimony concerning the declarations
of any other deceased or unavailable person." Clearly, the court's
concern with unduly restricting the pedigree rule stems from its
failure to consider separately the competency and admissibility
questions and thus seems unpersuasive. Somewhat more compelling
is the Berlin court's observation that perjury is just as likely to occur
in situations not within the ambit of the Dead Man's Statute as in
circumstances covered by the statute. Such a consideration, how-
ever, more properly is evaluated in determining the wisdom of
adopting a Dead-Man's-Statute-like principle;0 9 since the legisla-
ture has enacted CPLR 4519, this consideration no longer is relevant
and should be disregarded by the courts, whose function now is to
apply the statute in accordance with its terms and the pertinent
case law.101 By not giving application to section 4519, it is submitted,
render him incompetent. Thus, the former trial either was held prior to the decedent's death,
at which time the decedent had an opportunity to examine the witness, see note 82 supra, or
involved a waiver of the statute. See Dean v. Halliburton, 241 N.Y. 354, 150 N.E. 141 (1925).
It is suggested that authors Weinstein, Korn and Miller did not intend to enunciate a
general rule that evidence admissible under any hearsay exception is not barred by the Dead
Man's Statute. Rather, the context of the section in which the quote appears makes it clear
that the authors are discussing only substitutes for testimony. See 5 WK&M 4519.23.
Hence, in addition to the former testimony exception, the authors point out that an inter-
ested witness will be permitted to authenticate a business record of a debt of a decedent on
the ground that the authentication testimony does not involve a transaction with the dece-
dent. See William L. Mantha Co. v. DeGraff, 266 N.Y. 581, 195 N.E. 209 (1935) (mem.).
Thus, in contrast to the Berlin situation, there are independent grounds, other than the mere
existence of a hearsay exception, for holding the Dead Man's Statute inapplicable when
former testimony or the authentication of business records is involved.
9 91 Misc. 2d at 667-68, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36.
Id. at 668, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
'0 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"I! Prior to the enactment of CPLR 4519 in 1963, the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure recommended the abolishment of the "Dead Man's Statute," SECOND REP.
268, finding that:
The statute achieves . . . protection of the dead against possible injustice to their
estates through perjury accepted by naive triers of fact, at the expense of the honest
living whose mouths are stopped from proving valid claims. It has created enormous
[Vol. 52:137
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the Berlin court inadvertently may have engaged in an unwarranted
act of judicial legislation.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 20.20(2)(b): Criminal jurisdiction exercised over out-of-state
assault committed aboard an in-flight aircraft.
Section 20.20(2)(b) of the CPL provides that a New York court
may exercise jurisdiction over a criminal offense in which no crimi-
nal conduct occurred in the state if "[t]he statute defining the
offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect
in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed
was performed with intent that it would have such effect."' 10 This
potentially broad jurisdictional grant is, limited by CPL § 20.10(4)
which defines a "particular effect" as "a materially harmful impact
upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particu-
lar jurisdiction."' 103 Despite the restrictive effect of this definition,
the New York City Criminal Court, Queens County, in People v.
difficulty in litigation and has been condemned as unfair in operation and unsound
in principle by every modem student of the law of evidence.
Id. As a result of fervent opposition, the committee later withdrew this recommendation. See
RICHARDSON, supra note 78, § 396. Professor McCormick, a noted commentator on the law of
evidence, also had recommended that the statute be eliminated. According to McCormick,
if the interested witness is permitted to testify, a "searching cross-examination," along with
an observation of the witness' demeanor on the stand, will furnish a sufficient basis for
evaluating the witness' credibility. In rejecting the statute's positive aspects, Professor
McCormick stated that "[olne who would not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at suborn-
ing a third person, who would not be disqualified, to swear to the false story." C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDEN E § 65 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
It would appear that the Dead Man's Statute is disfavored by the New York courts. See
Phillips v. Joseph Kantor & Co., 31 N.Y.2d 307, 291 N.E.2d 129, 338 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1972),
wherein the Court, faced with an accounting malpractice situation, permitted evidence ex-
cludable at trial under CPLR 4519 to be utilized to defeat a motion for summary judgment;
Ward v. Kovacs, 55 App. Div. 2d 391,390 N.Y.S.2d 931 (2d Dep't 1977), wherein an interested
plaintiff introduced into evidence the deceased defendant's deposition taken prior to trial and
was then permitted to testify regarding transactions with the decedent covered in the deposi-
tion. One commentator reasoned that decisions such as Phillips reflect a "reluctance of the
higher courts in this state to impose the bar of the statute if there is any possibility that it
may be averted." 5 WK&M 4519.06. Although courts thus may seek to limit the provisions
of CPLR 4519 whenever possible, the courts in Phillips and Ward did not deny completely
the statute's applicability. In Phillips, the court ruled that the statute contains language
rendering it applicable only at the actual trial, while in Ward the court merely construed an
express exception in the statute. See, e.g., Nay v. Curley, 113 N.Y. 575, 21 N.E. 698 (1889).
In contrast to the decision in Berlin, however, the Court of Appeals in Phillips, stated that
"[u]pon a trial, the full policy of the Dead Man's Statute will be given unstinting applica-
tion." 31 N.Y.2d 307, 315, 291 N.E.2d 129, 133, 338 N.Y.S.2d 882, 888 (1972).
'1 CPL § 20.20(2)(b). See generally 1 M. WAxNER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE
1.2[1] (1976 & Supp. 1977).
'0 CPL § 20.10(4).
1977]
